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Abstract	  
The	   collective	   production	   of	   future-­‐oriented	   images	   is	   a	   significant	   activity	   that	   enables	   the	  
design	   of	   long-­‐term	   strategies	   for	   climate	  mitigation.	   In	   Europe,	   the	   image	   provided	   by	   the	  
Kyoto	   target	   induced	   a	   particular	   anticipatory	   action	   that	   consisted	   in	   performing	   carbon	  
markets	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  climate	  mitigation.	  Building	  on	  original	  empirical	  material	  
(the	   GETS	   experiment),	  we	   discuss	   the	   strategic	   dimension	   of	   performativity	   as	   anticipatory	  
action.	  We	   argue	   that	   the	   specific	   activities	   that	   supported	   the	   performation	   of	   theoretical	  
carbon	  markets	  were	  closely	  related	  with	  how	  strategic	  actors	  envisioned	  the	  future.	  The	  GETS	  
(Greenhouse	   gas	   and	   Electricity	   Trading	   Simulation)	   is	   an	   initiative	   undertaken	   by	   the	  
European	   electricity	   sector	   that	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   EU-­‐ETS.	  
Surprisingly,	  it	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  records.	  From	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	  the	  paper	  highlights	  
the	  role	  of	  mediating	  instruments	  in	  enabling	  the	  joint	  process	  of	  performing	  carbon	  markets	  
and	  unfolding	  a	  low	  carbon	  future.	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Introduction	  
This	  paper	  explores	  how	  the	  private	  sector	  engages	  in	  strategic	  anticipatory	  action	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  climate	  change.	  How	  do	  companies	  develop	  intervention	  capacities	  and	  patterns	  to	  
act	  upon	  a	  future	  that	  is	  both	  indeterminate	  and	  threatening?	  How	  can	  anticipatory	  strategies	  
be	   devised	   when	   information	   on	   both	   future	   conditions	   and	   the	   regulatory	   framework	   is	  
limited,	   diffuse,	   and	   often	   contradictory	   (Godard,	   2004)?	   In	   a	   soft	   regulatory	   context,	  
companies	   facing	   shared	   uncertainties	  must	   create	   the	   conditions	   needed	   for	   the	   future	   to	  
become	   manageable	   (Aggeri,	   1999).	   The	   question	   of	   how	   indeterminate	   futures	   are	   acted	  
upon	  is	  not	  new	  and	  has	  materialised	  in	  various	  forms	  within	  organisations	  (Anderson,	  2010).	  
In	   this	  paper	  we	  more	  specifically	  examine	  the	  performation	  of	  carbon	  markets	   in	  Europe	  as	  
anticipatory	  action	  and	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  way	  the	  power	  sector	  frames	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  
change.	  
Climate	  change	  provides	  good	  empirical	  insight	  to	  explore	  how	  the	  future	  is	  being	  related	  
to	  contemporary	  anticipatory	  action,	  as	   in	   this	  context	  “acting	   in	  advance	  of	   the	   future	   is	  an	  
integral,	  yet	  taken	  for	  granted,	  part	  of	  liberal-­‐democratic	  life”	  (Anderson,	  2010).	  The	  imminent	  
threat	   of	   dangerous	   climate	   change	   (Liverman,	   2009)	   justifies	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   anticipatory	  
action.	  One	  such	  type	  of	  action	  consists	   in	  promoting	  an	  alternative	  future	  that	   is	  commonly	  
referred	  to	  as	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  future	  (Nerlich,	  2012)	  through	  mitigation	  strategies.	  The	  adoption	  
in	  2003	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS1	  was	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  future	  in	  Europe.	  In	  response	  to	  
1European	  Emission	  Trading	  Scheme	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the	  Kyoto	  protocol,	  the	  European	  Commission	  set	  out	  the	  performation	  of	  carbon	  markets	  as	  a	  
cornerstone	  of	  its	  mitigation	  strategy.	  	  
To	  be	  acted	  upon,	  an	   indeterminate,	  ambiguous	  and	  uncertain	   future	  must	  somehow	  be	  
known.	  The	  production	  of	  stable	  and	  certain	  images	  of	  the	  future	  is	  a	  strategic	  activity	  within	  
our	  modern	  societies	   that	   seeks	   to	   inform	  our	  choices	   in	   the	  present	  and	   to	  drive	   long-­‐term	  
social	   and	   technical	   changes	   (Borup	   and	   al,	   2006).	   By	   reducing	   its	   complexity	   and	   bringing	  
clarity	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  certainty	  into	  what	  the	  future	  might	  hold,	  they	  open	  and	  support	  
new	  capabilities	   for	   action.	  Drawing	  on	   the	   case	  of	   the	  EU-­‐ETS,	   this	  paper	  explores	  how	   the	  
performation	   of	   economics	   (Callon,	   1998;	   MacKenzie,	   2004;	   Muniesa	   and	   Callon,	   2007)	   is	  
being	   related	   to	   the	   future	   through	   the	   production	   of	   future-­‐oriented	   images.	  We	   adopt	   a	  
mediating	  instruments	  approach	  (Miller	  and	  O’Leary,	  2007)	  to	  investigate	  how	  concrete	  tools,	  
instruments	  and	  devices	  supported	  both	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  future	  and	  the	  performation	  of	  
carbon	   markets.	   This	   paper	   intends	   to	   provide	   insights	   on	   how	   both	   the	   future-­‐oriented	  
images	  of	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  future	  and	  carbon	  markets	  were	  reflexively	  engineered	  and	  reshaped,	  
following	  a	  complex	  design	  process.	  	  
There	   is	   an	   official	   story	   of	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   EU-­‐ETS.	   Drawing	   on	   thirty	   years	   of	  
economic	   theory,	   the	  European	  Commission	   implemented	   the	  world's	   first	   carbon	  market	   in	  
the	  world	  (see	  e.g.	  Convery,	  2009;	  Damro	  and	  Luaces-­‐Mendes,	  2003;	  Ellerman	  and	  al,	  2010).	  
One	   part	   of	   the	   story	   that	   was	   left	   out	   is	   the	   huge	   collective	   inquiry	   that	   supported	   the	  
performation	   of	   carbon	  markets	   (Braun,	   2009).	   Building	   on	   Callon’s	   view	   of	   carbon	  markets	  
(2009)	  as	  on-­‐going	  collective	  experiments,	  we	  re-­‐analyse	   the	  construction	  of	  carbon	  markets	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by	  looking	  at	  one	  of	  the	  experiments	  that	  had	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  the	  performation	  of	  the	  EU-­‐
ETS.	  From	  1999	  to	  2001	  the	  European	  power	  sector	  engaged	  in	  the	  simulation	  of	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  
future	   through	   role	   play	   using	   an	   experimental	   carbon	   market	   device	   named	   GETS.	   This	  
experiment	  had	  a	  considerable	  impact	  on	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  in	  Europe.	  
Yet,	  interestingly	  enough,	  there	  are	  no	  traces	  of	  this	  experiment	  in	  the	  abundant	  literature	  on	  
the	   implementation	   of	   the	   EU-­‐ETS.	   Using	   this	   enigma	   as	   our	   starting	   point,	   we	   carried	   out	  
empirical	   research	  on	   the	  GETS	  experiment,	  how	   it	  was	  conducted,	   the	   tools	  and	  models	  on	  
which	  it	  was	  based,	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  about	  low-­‐carbon	  futures	  that	  it	  performed.	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  paper	   is	  organised	  as	   follows.	  We	   first	  explore	   the	  notion	  of	   future-­‐oriented	   images	  
and	   how	   they	   support	   action;	   in	   particular	   how	   they	   induced	   the	   performation	   of	   carbon	  
markets	   in	   Europe.	   Second,	   we	   review	   the	   research	   programme	   on	   the	   performativity	   of	  
economics.	  The	  question	  of	  how	  strategic	  performation	  activities	  are	  being	  used	  to	  address	  the	  
future	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   investigated.	  Drawing	   on	   the	   largely	   unknown	  GETS	   case,	  we	  use	   a	  
mediating	   instruments	   approach	   to	   provide	   another	   narrative	   of	   the	   construction	   of	   the	  
carbon	  market	  in	  Europe.	  In	  this	  alternative	  story,	  the	  paths	  leading	  to	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  future	  are	  
multiple	  and	  uncertain,	  based	  on	  a	  distributed	  engineering	  process	  in	  which	  tools	  (simulations,	  
calculation	  devices)	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  collective	  making	  of	  low-­‐carbon	  futures.	  Finally,	  we	  
investigate	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   GETS	   impacted	   the	   way	   that	   the	   response	   to	   climate	  
change	  is	  being	  framed	  at	  different	  levels.	  
Building	  on	  images	  to	  act	  upon	  the	  future	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Producing	  future-­‐oriented	  images,	  a	  strategic	  activity	  
On	  the	  diversity	  of	  future-­‐oriented	  images.	  Over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  the	  significant	  growth	  of	  
climate	  change	  as	  a	  topic	  of	  political	  debate	  has	  generated	  abundant	  future-­‐oriented	  images:	  
the	   Kyoto	   targets,	   the	  UNEP	  maps	   coloured	   in	   red	   and	   orange	   to	   stress	   the	   vulnerability	   of	  
populations	  to	  future	  climate	  change	  (Nellemann	  and	  al,	  2011),	  the	  IEA	  technology	  roadmaps	  
setting	  the	  milestones	  for	  the	  transition	  to	  low-­‐carbon	  technologies,	  the	  IPCC	  charts	  showing	  
surface	  warming	  projections	   (IPCC,	  2007),	   etc.	   The	  nature	  of	   these	   images,	   their	  origin,	  how	  
they	   circulate	   and	   the	   actions	   they	   induce	   are	   particularly	   heterogeneous,	   given	   the	   wide	  
range	   of	   actors	   involved	   in	   their	   production,	   the	   specific	   interests	   they	   defend,	   and	   the	  
methods	  they	  use	  to	  produce	  them.	   In	  this	  paper	  we	  focus	  on	  the	   images	  that	  are	  produced	  
through	  a	  conscious	  and	  organised	  epistemic	  operation.	  Anderson	   (2010)	  distinguishes	   three	  
ways	   of	   producing	   future-­‐oriented	   images:	   scientific	   methods	   (e.g.	   modeling),	   performance	  
(e.g.	   role-­‐plays)	   and	   imagination	   exercises	   (e.g.	   backcasting).	   We	   especially	   look	   at	   the	  
experimental	  exercises	  that	  are	  undertaken	  by	  organizational	  actors	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  future.	  
On	   the	   nature	   of	   future-­‐oriented	   images	   (FOI).	   For	   heuristic	   purposes,	   we	   distinguish	   five	  
constituent	  tensions	  within	  these	  FOI:	  (1)	  they	  exist	  and	  circulate	  through	  materialities	  such	  as	  
reports	   and	   maps	   (Anderson,	   2010;	   Liverman,	   2009)	   or	   immaterialities	   such	   as	   discourses,	  
narratives	   and	   lexical	   “carbon	   compounds”	   such	   as	   a	   low-­‐carbon	   future	   (Hulme,	   2008;	  
Liverman,	  2009;	  Nerlich,	   2012);	   (2)	   they	   can	  be	  either	   individual	  or	   collective:	   in	   the	   case	  of	  
climate	  change,	  there	  is	  an	  organization	  –	  the	  IPCC	  –	  in	  charge	  of	  making	  collective	  the	  images	  
produced	   through	   scientific	  methods;	   (3)	   they	   can	  be	   concise	  or	  elaborate;	   for	   instance,	   the	  






same	   future	   climate	   state	   can	   be	   presented	   in	   a	   reduced	   format	   using	   numbers	   (Amoore,	  
2009),	  such	  as	  forecasts	  on	  temperature	  increases	  or	  detailed	  scenarios	  (Anderson,	  2007	  ;	  de	  
Goede	  and	  Randalls,	  2009);	  (4)	  they	  can	  be	  positive	  –	  utopias	  –	  or	  negative	  –	  dystopias	  (Hjerpe	  
and	  Linnér,	  2009;	  Van	  Aalst	  MK,	  2006);	  and	   (5)	   they	  can	  be	  predictive	  and	  show	  what	  might	  
happen,	  e.g.	  the	  IPCC	  reports,	  or	  normative	  and	  show	  a	  more	  desirable	  future,	  e.g.	  the	  Kyoto	  
targets.	  By	  definition,	  FOI	  capture	  only	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  future,	  as	  every	  attempt	  to	  depict	  
the	   future	   requires	   the	   selection	   	   of	   information	   from	   an	   abundance	   of	   data	   to	   provide	   a	  
simplified	  representation	  (Segrestin,	  2006).	  They	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive:	  one	  same	  state	  of	  
the	   future	  climate	  can	  be	  described	  using	  different	   images	   that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  coherent	  
with	  one	  another.	  
	  
Driving	  change	  through	  future-­‐oriented	  images	  
Future-­‐oriented	  images	  are	  artificial	  representations	  of	  the	  future	  that	  make	  it	  actionable	  (de	  
Goede	  and	  Randalls,	  2009;	  Liverman,	  2009;	  Pinder,	  2005).	  Their	  role	  in	  relating	  contemporary	  
action	  to	  the	  future	  has	  inspired	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  academic	  work	  in	  social	  studies.	  For	  
example,	  with	  regard	  to	  technological	   innovation,	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  scholars	  from	  the	  fields	  of	  
economic	  history,	   innovation	  studies	  and	  the	  sociology	  of	   technology	  and	  science	  have	  been	  
exploring	   the	   role	   of	   “expectations”	   in	   driving	   social,	   economic,	   scientific	   and	   technological	  
change	   (Borup	   and	   al,	   2006;	   Brown	   and	   al,	   2000;	   Eames,	   2006;	  Guice,	   1999;	  Michael,	   2000;	  
Van	  Lente,	  1993).	  The	  literature	  on	  risk	  management	  offers	  insight	  into	  how	  the	  construction	  






of	  risks	  induces	  prevention,	  pre-­‐emption,	  preparedness	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  anticipatory	  action	  
(Nyberg	  and	  Wright,	  2011).	  	  
	  
Performing	  Carbon	  Markets	  in	  Europe:	  A	  “textbook	  case”	  
The	   construction	   of	   the	   European	   carbon	  market	   is	   a	   “textbook	   case”	   of	   how	   future-­‐
oriented	   images	   induce	   action	   in	   the	   present.	   From	   1992	   the	   international	   community	   was	  
mobilised	  around	  images	  produced	  by	  the	  IPCC,	  to	  collectively	  negotiate	  an	  alternative	  future	  
which	  was	  to	  be	  institutionalised	  in	  1997	  in	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol.	  The	  desirable	  future	  was	  then	  
represented	   by	   a	   single	   new	   image,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   figures:	   the	   greenhouse	   gas	   reduction	  
objectives	  to	  be	   imposed	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  Annex	  1	  countries.	   In	  Europe,	  this	   image	  has	  been	  
built	  around	  a	  particular	  action	   logic:	   the	  performation	  of	  economic	   theory.	  The	  story	  of	   the	  
construction	  of	  the	  European	  carbon	  market	  as	  influenced	  by	  economic	  thought	  and	  concepts	  
is	  well	   known	   and	   has	   been	   documented	   by	  many	   scholars,	   in	   particular	   by	   the	   economists	  
who	  were	  at	  the	  helm	  of	  that	  very	  construction:	  among	  others,	  Peter	  Vis	  and	  Peter	  Zapfel,	  two	  
civil	   servants	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   dossier	   at	   the	   European	   Commission;	   Jos	   Delbeke	   who	   was	  
supervising	  the	  team	  at	  the	  European	  Commission;	  Frank	  Convery,	  who	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  
the	  negotiations	  as	  an	  observer,	  and	  Denny	  Ellerman,	  an	  expert	  on	   the	  US	  SO2	  markets.	  The	  
official	  story	  of	  the	  European	  Emission	  Trading	  Scheme	  (EU-­‐ETS)	  is	  often	  defined	  by	  two	  critical	  
moments.	  	  
	  






Theory	  Building.	  The	  idea	  of	  using	  a	  market	  to	  manage	  industrial	  emissions	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  
to	   Ronald	   Coase	   (1960)	   and	   his	   seminal	   article,	   The	   Problem	   of	   Social	   Cost.	   Crocker	   (1966),	  
Dales	   (1968)	   and	   Montgomery	   (1972)	   further	   developed	   Coase’s	   theoretical	   framework	   to	  
apply	   it	   to	  environmental	   issues	  (Tietenberg,	  2006;	  Convery,	  2009;	  Ellerman,	  Convery	  and	  de	  
Perthuis,	   2010;	   Ellerman,	   2003).	   In	   1995,	   the	   US	   Environmental	   Protection	   Agency	   (EPA)	  
launched	   the	   first	   ‘cap-­‐and-­‐trade’	  market	   covering	   SO2	   emissions	   at	   national	   level,	   which	   is	  
often	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  direct	  ancestor	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS	  (Ellerman,	  Convery	  and	  de	  Perthuis,	  
2010;	  Damro	  and	  Luaces-­‐Mendez,	  2003).	  	  
	  
Performing	   theoretical	   carbon	   markets.	   Responding	   to	   the	   impulse	   of	   the	   Kyoto	   protocol	  
(Convery,	   2009;	   Skjaerseth	   and	  Wettestad,	   2008;	   Zapfel	   and	   Vaino,	   2002)	   and	   following	   its	  
failure	  to	  implement	  a	  carbon	  and	  energy	  tax	  at	  the	  domestic	   level	  (Braun,	  2009;	  Newell	  and	  
Paterson,	  1998;	  Wetestad,	  2005),	   the	  European	  Commission	  organised	   the	   construction	  of	   a	  
regional	   emission	   trading	   scheme.	   The	   European	   Commission´s	   climate	   change	   team	   then	  
succeeded	   in	  securing	  consensus	  among	   the	  main	  stakeholders	  during	  a	  stormy	  consultation	  
process	  (Christiansen	  and	  Wettestad,	  2003;	  Convery,	  2009;	  Hepburn	  and	  al,	  2006;	  Zapfel	  and	  
Vainio,	  2002).	  
	  
What	   the	   story	   tells	   us.	  This	   narrative	   tells	   us	   about	   the	   performation	   of	   theoretical	   carbon	  
markets	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  European	  Kyoto	  target.	  Given	  the	  underlying	  tensions	  identified	  
by	   Muniesa	   and	   Callon	   (2008),	   we	   can	   qualify	   the	   act	   of	   performation	   carried	   out	   by	   the	  






Commission	   as:	   (1)	   planned	   –	   the	   action	   was	   not	   spontaneous,	   it	   was	   organised	   by	   the	  
European	   Commission;	   and	   (2)	   restricted	   –	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   flowed	   from	   a	   scientific	   core	   of	  
economics	  "outwards",	  towards	  the	  world	  of	  economic	  experts	  in	  charge	  of	  devising	  a	  market	  
device	  based	  on	  economic	  theory.	  
	  
What	  the	  story	  does	  not	  tell	  us.	  In	  the	  official	  story	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS,	  the	  performative	  nature	  of	  
carbon	  markets	  is	  taken	  for	  granted.	  There	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  invisible	  “performative	  work”	  
carried	  out	  by	  strategic	  actors	   to	  create	  the	  socio-­‐technical	  conditions	   for	  carbon	  markets	   to	  
materialise.	   To	   paraphrase	   Callon	   (2009),	   the	   making	   of	   carbon	   markets	   is	   an	   ongoing	  
collective	   experiment.	   A	   variety	   of	   actors	   conducted	   continuous,	   original	   experiments	   in	  
laboratories,	   in	   vivo	   (real	   scale	   experiments),	   or	   by	  way	  of	   experimental	   platforms	   (Muniesa	  
and	   Callon,	   2007)	   that	   participated	   in	   the	  material	   construction	   of	   carbon	  markets	   and	   the	  
goods	   exchanged	   on	   them	   (Braun,	   2009;	   Lohman,	   2009;	   MacKenzie,	   2009).	   Amongst	   these	  
actors,	   with	   their	   different	   interests,	   projects,	   objectives	   and	   knowledge,	   were	   those	   that	  
Callon	  (2009)	  calls	  the	  "usual	  suspects",	  that	  is,	  those	  who	  are	  legitimate	  and	  clearly	  visible	  in	  
the	   construction	   of	   European	   environmental	   directives,	   such	   as	   officials	   from	   the	   European	  
Commission	   DG	   XI,	   and	   stakeholders	   officially	   mobilised	   in	   the	   regulation	   process	   (NGOs,	  
experts,	  representatives	  of	  industry,	  etc.),	  as	  well	  as	  various	  actors	  who	  initially	  had	  no	  say	  in	  
the	  matter.	  
One	   of	   the	   unacknowledged	   experiments	   that	   was	   undertaken	   before	   the	   EU-­‐ETS	   was	  
established	  was	  led	  by	  the	  European	  power	  sector.	  It	  is	  called	  the	  GETS	  (Greenhouse	  Emission	  






Trading	  Scheme).	  Strangely	  enough,	  even	  though	  this	  experiment	  is	  sometimes	  recognised	  as	  a	  
pioneering	   experiment	   among	   certain	   experts	   in	   the	   domain,	   it	   is	   hardly	   mentioned	   in	   the	  
literature	   about	   the	   history	   of	   the	   EU-­‐ETS2.	   There	   are	   nevertheless	   two	   clues	   indicating	   the	  
importance	   of	   this	   experiment	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   European	   carbon	   market:	   the	   rules	  
underpinning	  the	  design	  of	  GETS2,	  and	  those	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS	  pilot	  directive	  are	  almost	  identical	  
despite	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   were	   many	   other	   possible	   designs	   proposed	   (see	   Table	   1).	   The	  
network	  of	  experts	  who	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  GETS	  experiment	  gradually	  expanded	  to	  include	  
experts	  who	  were	  then	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS.	  	  	  	  
	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Insert	  Table	  1	  about	  here-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	  
These	   two	   clues	   attracted	   our	   attention.	   If	   this	   experiment	   played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  
making	   of	   the	   EU-­‐ETS,	   why	   is	   it	   not	   mentioned	   in	   the	   literature?	   If	   its	   significance	   can	   be	  
verified,	  what	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  future	  did	  this	  experiment	  actually	  perform?	  	  
The	  fact	  of	  considering	  a	  detail	  as	  significant	  or	   insignificant	   is	  not	  an	  empirical	  question.	  On	  
the	   contrary,	   it	   is	   a	   theoretical	   one.	   As	   certain	   work	   in	   the	   pragmatic	   philosophy	   literature	  
reminds	  us	  (Latour,	  1987),	  we	  may	  well	  wonder	  whether	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intellectual	  construction	  
underpinning	  theoretical	  accounts	  that	  causes	  all	  those	  elements	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  with	  it	  to	  be	  
eliminated.	  In	  the	  official	  history	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  carbon	  markets	  written	  by	  economists,	  
experiments	   play	   a	   secondary	   role.	   Theory	   prevails.	   But	   a	   whole	   other	   history	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	  academic	  articles	  citing	  the	  GETS	  experiment,	  see	  Braun,	  2009;	  Meckling,	  2011.	  	  






construction	  of	  markets	  and	  associated	  futures	  is	  possible.	  It	  consists	  in	  considering	  the	  design	  
of	  markets,	  following	  Callon,	  as	  a	  process	  of	  experimentation	  under	  uncertainty,	  based	  on	  the	  
use	  of	  instruments	  and	  devices.	  
	  
From	   a	   theoretical	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   GETS	   case	   study	   can	   evidence	   about	   the	   relationship	  




Studying	  the	  performativity	  of	  economics	  
In	  recent	  years,	  a	  research	  programme	  specifically	  dedicated	  to	  the	  performativity	  of	  
economics	   has	   been	   developed.	   This	   programme	   was	   launched	   in	   1998	   with	   Callon’s	   book	  
“The	   Laws	   of	   the	   Markets”	   to	   provide	   a	   new	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  
economics	  –	  as	   a	  discipline	  –	  and	   the	  economy	  –	  as	   an	  activity.	   Since	   then,	   a	  wide	   range	  of	  
literature	   has	   flourished,	   providing	   a	   stimulating	   view	   on	   the	   way	  markets	   are	   created	   and	  
transformed	   (Muniesa	   and	   Callon,	   2008).	   One	   particular	   branch	   of	   this	   programme	   –	  which	  
MacKenzie	   (2007)	   labels	   generic	   –	   focuses	   on	   the	   activities	   that	   support	   performativity.	  
Building	  the	  concrete	  conditions	  for	  a	  theoretical	  statement	  to	  become	  true	  involves	  a	  specific	  
work.	   Callon	   recommends	   that	   special	   attention	   be	   given	   to	   the	   socio-­‐technical	   agency	   that	  
verifies	  a	  theoretical	  statement	  and	  its	  evolution.	  Following	  this	  recommendation,	  MacKenzie	  
and	  Millo’s	  seminal	  work	  (MacKenzie,	  2003;	  2004;	  2006;	  MacKenzie	  and	  Millo,	  2003)	  focuses	  






on	   the	   dynamic	   adjustments	   between	   the	   Black-­‐Scholes	   equation	   and	   its	   socio-­‐technical	  
environment.	  The	   formula	  “did	  not	  simply	  describe	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  world,	  but	  helped	  create	  a	  
world	   of	   which	   the	   theory	   was	   a	   truer	   reflection”	   (MacKenzie,	   2003:	   835).	   The	   dynamic	  
adjustment	  of	  both	  a	  theoretical	  statement	  and	  the	  world	  to	  which	  it	  relates	  is	  supported	  by	  
experimental	   activities	   that	   enable	   the	   testing,	   amendment	   and	   remaking	   of	   the	   material	  
conditions	   needed	   for	   the	   statement	   to	   fit	   its	   environment	   (Guala,	   2005;	   2007).	   From	   a	  
managerial	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  question	  of	  how	  performative	  work	  is	  being	  related	  to	  the	  future	  
offers	   stimulating	  perspectives	  as	   it	   re-­‐repositions	   strategic	   actors,	   in	  particular	   firms,	   at	   the	  
heart	  of	  the	  research	  inquiry.	  	  
	  
An	  instrument-­‐based	  approach	  to	  collective	  action	  	  
The	  GETS	  experiment	  relied	  on	  a	  set	  of	  tools	  and	  instruments	  that	  enabled	  the	  performation	  of	  
carbon	   markets.	   Taking	   the	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   these	   instruments	   further,	   we	   built	   an	  
analytical	   framework	   derived	   from	   a	   “mediating-­‐instrument”	   (Miller	   and	   O’Leary,	   2007)	   or	  
“instrument-­‐based	  approach”	  of	  collective	  action	  (Labatut	  and	  al.,	  2012),	  as	  it	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  
the	  literature.	  	  
From	   management	   tools	   to	   mediating	   instruments.	   The	   theoretical	   approach	  
underpinning	   mediating	   instruments	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   management	   studies	   of	  
management	   tools	   in	   the	   1970s	   in	   France	   and	   the	   UK.	  Management	   tools	   are	   the	   invisible	  
technical	   infrastructure	   that	   supports	   organised	   action	   (Berry,	   1983;	  Moisdon,	   1997;	   2005).	  
They	  support	  intervention	  by	  increasing	  actors’	  rationality	  (Hatchuel	  and	  Weil,	  1995).	  Drawing	  






on	  Aggeri	  and	  Labatut	  (2010)	  we	  use	  the	  word	  “tool”	  to	  denote	  basic	  support	  for	  intervention	  
(e.g.	  indicators	  or	  scorecards).	  “Instruments”	  refer	  to	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  complexity.	  They	  involve	  
a	   greater	   degree	   of	   reflexivity	   by	   designers	   and	   users	   than	   do	   tools	   (e.g.	   decision-­‐making	  
instruments,	  economic	  models).	  The	  word	  “device”	  refers	  to	  intricate	  combinations	  of	  agents,	  
management	  tools	  and	  knowledge.	  	  
Mediating	   instrument	  and	   collective	  action.	  Miller	   and	  O’Leary	   (2007)	  use	   the	  notion	  of	  
mediating	  instruments	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  instruments	  that	  provide	  strong	  coordination	  support	  
for	   collective	   action.	   Building	   on	   the	   case	   of	   the	   microprocessor	   industry,	   they	   show	   that	  
Moore’s	   law	  brought	  together	  actors	  and	  domains	  and	  legitimised	  investment,	   in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	  the	  making	  of	  future	  markets	  for	  microprocessors	  could	  continue.	  Mediating	  instruments	  
frame	  collective	  representations	  and	  decisions	  so	  as	   to	  make	  the	  collective	  construction	  of	  a	  
desirable	  future	  possible.	  	  
Collective	  learning	  and	  mediating	  instruments.	  We	  define	  learning	  as	  the	  process	  whereby	  
actors	  share	  or	  generate	  knowledge	  collectively	  (Hatchuel,	  1994).	  “There	  are	  two	  ways	  one	  can	  
learn	  from	  [management	  tools]:	  by	  crafting	  them	  and	  by	  using	  them"	  (Morrison	  and	  Morgan,	  
1999).	   The	   construction	   of	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   its	   regeneration	   depends	   on	   actors’	  
reflexive	  ability	  to	  re-­‐make	  their	   instruments	  and	  rethink	  the	  way	  they	  work	  (Hacking,	  1993).	  
Instruments	  are	   the	  prism	  through	  which	   the	   future	  becomes	  observable.	   Instrumentation	   is	  
designed	   and	   regenerated	   throughout	   the	   exploration	  process	   to	   explore	   further	   and	   “learn	  
what	  has	  to	  be	  learnt”	  (Hatchuel	  and	  al,	  2005).	  	  
	  







In	   line	  with	  these	  theoretical	  groundings,	  we	  explore	  how	  performative	  work	  undertaken	  
by	  strategic	  actors	  is	  being	  related	  to	  the	  future.	  	  
1. The	  performation	  of	  a	  theoretical	  statement	  within	  the	  present	  and	  the	  exploration	  of	  
the	  future	  are	  two	  intertwined	  activities.	  	  
2. These	  two	  activities	  are	  undertaken	  jointly	  through	  the	  dynamic	  testing	  and	  revision	  of	  
a	  mediating	  instrument	  (Miller	  and	  O´Leary,	  2007).	  	  
3. The	  performation	  process	  is	  supported	  by	  experiments	  that	  take	  place	  within	  specific	  
spaces	   that	  Muniesa	   and	   Callon	   (2007)	   call	   platforms.	   Platforms	   have	   received	   little	  




In	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  European	  electricity	  sector	  was	  faced	  with	  two	  major	  challenges:	  (1)	  
the	   liberalisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  sector;	  and	  (2)	  the	   imminent	  threat	  of	  a	  carbon	  constraint	  
following	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol.	   Due	   to	   the	   high	   carbon	   content	   of	   traditional	   electricity	  
production	   –	   that	   relied	   heavily	   on	   fossil	   fuels	   –	   a	   carbon	   constraint	  would	   potentially	   have	  
huge	  impacts	  on	  industrial	  activity.	  
A	  first	  set	  of	  questions	  had	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  regarding	  technology	  and	  R&D	  issues:	  would	  
the	  sector	  have	  to	  deploy	  existing	  technologies?	  Would	  it	  have	  to	  design	  new	  technologies	  to	  
deliver	   low-­‐carbon	   electricity?	   Would	   it	   have	   to	   change	   its	   relations	   with	   consumers	   to	  






enhance	   end-­‐user	   energy	   efficiency?	   Would	   its	   activity	   simply	   gradually	   disappear,	   to	   be	  
replaced	  with	  decentralised	  private	  energy	  systems?	  	  
Another	   set	  of	  questions	  was	  more	   concerned	  with	  policy	  debates:	  how	  much	   time	  was	  
left	   to	  organise	   the	  energy	   transition?	  What	  policies	  would	   the	  public	  authorities	   implement	  
for	  this	  purpose?	  
Without	   reliable	   scientific	   knowledge	   on	   both	   the	   future	   conditions	   and	   the	   R&D	   effort	  
that	  were	  needed	  to	  build	  a	  desirable	  future,	  actors	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  gathered	  to	  build	  
shared	  knowledge	  and	  common	  frameworks	  for	  action.	  They	  designed	  an	  experimental	  carbon	  
market	   device	   to	   simulate	   different	   low	   carbon	   futures.	   From	  1999	   to	   2001,	   Eurelectric,	   the	  




We	  conducted	  an	  in-­‐depth	  longitudinal	  case	  study	  analysis	  covering	  a	  5-­‐year	  period	  from	  the	  
“preparatory	   phase”	   of	   Kyoto	   in	   1997	   to	   the	   EU-­‐ETS	   implementation	   in	   2003	   	   (Pettigrew,	  
1990).	   The	   data	   were	   collected	   over	   two	   and	   a	   half	   years	   of	   in-­‐depth	   investigation,	   from	  
December	  2009	  to	  June	  2012.	  	  	  
	  
Archival	   research.	  We	  collected	  both	   internal	  documents	   (personal	  mail	  archives,	  companies’	  
internal	   reports,	   etc.)	   and	   external	   documents	   (Eurelectric’s	   official	   position	   papers,	   GETS	  
simulation	  reports,	  the	  written	  accounts	  of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  stakeholder	  meetings,	  






etc).	  These	  documents	  provided	  us	  with	  two	  types	  of	   information:	  (1)	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  
GETS	  experiments,	  we	  have	  access	   to	   the	  knowledge	   (on	  carbon	  markets	  and	  on	   the	   future)	  
that	  was	  produced	  and	  to	  engineering	  activity	  that	  was	  undertaken	  on	  the	  device;	  (2)	  for	  the	  
period	  after	  the	  GETS	  experiment,	  we	  have	  access	  to	  material	  on	  the	  collective	  negotiation	  of	  
the	  design	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS	  pilot.	  This	  historical	  approach	  seeks	  to	  trace	  the	  collective	  inquiry	  on	  
both	   carbon	  markets	   and	  a	   carbon	   constrained	   future.	   It	   enables	  us	   to	   reconstruct	   the	  path	  
that	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  actors,	  as	  a	  back	  and	  forth	  process	  between	  future-­‐oriented	  images	  
and	  experimental	  performation	  devices.	  	  
	  
Interviews.	  We	   complemented	   the	   archival	   research	  with	   interviews	  with	   both	   the	   actors	   of	  
the	  GETS	  and	   the	  main	   stakeholders	  of	   the	  collective	   inquiry	  on	  carbon	  markets:	  what	  were	  
their	   strategic	   positions	   towards	   carbon	   markets	   and	   how	   did	   these	   positions	   evolve	  
throughout	  the	  GETS	  experiments?	  What	  types	  of	  strategic	  alliances	  were	  created	  around	  the	  
GETS	  performation	  device?	  We	  held	  18	  semi	  conducted	  interviews	  among	  these	  actors.	  
We	  distinguish	  with	   three	   types	  of	  actors	  playing	  different	   roles	   in	   the	  GETS	  experiment:	   (1)	  
the	   organisers	   of	   the	   experiment	   (economists,	   physicists,	   lobbyists,	   consultants,	   etc.);	   (2)	  
participants	   in	   the	   role	  play	   (mainly	  electricity	  companies,	   industrial	   companies	  and	   financial	  
institutions);	  and	  (3)	  external	  contributors.	  	  
Among	  the	  organisers	  of	   the	  role	  play,	  we	   interviewed	  two	  members	  of	  Eurelectric:	   (1)	   John	  
Scowcroft,	  Head	  of	  Eurelectric’s	  working	  group	  on	  climate	  change,	  who,	  since	  he	  had	  been	  in	  
charge	  of	  the	  dossier	  on	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  electricity	  sector	  at	  UNIPEDE,	  had	  become	  “a	  






devoted	   supporter	   of	   market	   instruments”	   (Scowcroft,	   2012);	   and	   (2)	   Jean-­‐Yves	   Caneill,	   a	  
member	   of	   the	   working	   group	  who	   had	   acquired	   special	   skills	   in	  modelling	   during	   his	   PhD.	  
From	   the	   International	   Energy	   Agency,	   we	   interviewed	   Richard	   Baron,	   a	   young	   economist	  
specialised	   in	  emission	   trading,	  who	  was	   in	   charge	  of	   supervising	   the	  GETS	   simulation.	   From	  
ParisBourse	   stock	   market,	   we	   interviewed	   Thierry	   Carol,	   a	   young	   trader	   interested	   in	   the	  
developments	  surrounding	  environmental	  markets.	  	  
Among	   the	   participants	   of	   the	   role	   play,	   we	   interviewed	   representatives	   of	   each	   sector	  
involved	   –	   electricity,	   industry,	   financial	   –,	   in	   order	   to	   compare	   their	   strategic	   positions	   and	  
expectations	   with	   regard	   to	   carbon	   markets	   and	   the	   evolution	   of	   these	   positions	   over	   the	  
course	  of	  the	  experiments.	  We	  interviewed	  Jean-­‐Yves	  Caneill	  again	   in	  his	  capacity	  as	  head	  of	  
climate	   policy	   at	   Electricité	   de	   France3.	   From	   the	   industry,	   we	  met	   Chris	   Boyd,	   who	   was	   in	  
charge	  of	  sustainability	   issues	  at	  Lafarge4	  and	  was	   in	   favour	  of	  market-­‐based	   instruments,	  as	  
well	   as	   two	  members	   of	   the	   paper	   industry.	   From	   the	   financial	   sector,	  we	   interviewed	  Dirk	  
Forister	   from	  NatSource,	  an	  asset	  management	  services	  provider	   for	  environmental	  markets.	  
He	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  defending	  the	  financial	  sector’s	  participation	  in	  the	  EU-­‐ETS	  as	  the	  sector’s	  
participation	   in	   a	   European	   carbon	  market	  was	   controversial.	  We	  weren’t	   able	   to	   interview	  
Peter	   Vis	   from	   the	   European	   Commission	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   GETS	   experiment	   as	   an	  
external	  advisor.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Electricité	  de	  France	  is	  the	  French	  leader	  in	  the	  electricity	  sector	  
4Lafarge	  is	  the	  French	  leader	  in	  the	  cement	  sector	  






As	   regards	   the	   main	   stakeholders	   who	   were	   not	   directly	   involved	   in	   the	   experiments,	   we	  
interviewed	   Peter	   Zapfel,	   a	   member	   of	   the	   team	   in	   charge	   of	   the	   Dossier	   at	   the	   European	  
Commission,	   to	   understand	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   EC	   and	   the	   electricity	  
sector.	  We	  also	  interviewed	  two	  carbon	  economists	  and	  one	  member	  of	  the	  French	  industrial	  
think	   tank	   on	   sustainable	   development	   “Entreprises	   Pour	   l’Environnement”	   (EPE),	   who	  
enriched	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  events	  that	  led	  from	  Kyoto	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS.	  	  
	  
Data	  analysis	  
Our	  aim	  was	  to	  identify	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  experimental	  activities	  undertaken	  within	  the	  GETS	  
experimental	  platform,	  on	  both	  the	  performation	  of	  carbon	  markets	  and	  the	  understanding	  of	  
future	  conditions.	  We	  built	  a	  genealogy	  that	  shows	  the	  joint	  evolution	  of	  three	  dimensions:	  
-­‐ the	  design	  of	  the	  GETS	  device	  
-­‐ the	  knowledge	  generated	  by	  the	  device	  
-­‐ the	   relations	   among	   the	   actors	   (organisers,	   participants,	   external	   advisors,	  
stakeholders)	  	  
Archival	   documents.	   We	   used	   the	   GETS	   reports	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   GETS	   device	   –	   rules,	  
instruments,	  actors	  –	  its	  evolution	  and	  the	  knowledge	  it	  produced.	  We	  then	  identified	  two	  key	  
steps	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  GETS	  device:	  first,	  a	  generic	  model	  of	  carbon	  markets	  was	  designed	  
in	   1999	   and	   used	   to	   support	   a	   role-­‐play;	   second,	   the	   GETS	   device	   was	   redesigned	   and	  
supported	  another	  role-­‐play.	  	  	  	  
Interviews.	  We	  used	  our	  interviews	  to	  answer	  two	  questions:	  






-­‐ 	  What	  are	   the	  assumptions	  underpinning	   the	  GETS	  device?	   In	  other	  words,	  what	  are	  
the	  models,	   scientific	   and	   technical	   knowledge,	   and	  modeling	   techniques	   that	   were	  
used	  to	  design	  the	  GETS	  device?	  We	  used	  the	  interviews	  we	  held	  among	  the	  designers	  
of	   the	   experiment	   –	   business	   people,	   economists	   and	   traders	   –	   to	   inform	   how	   they	  
crafted	  the	  device:	  what	  their	  background,	  skills	  and	  interests	  were.	  
-­‐ How	   did	   the	   two	   experiments	   reframe	   the	   actors’	   representations,	   relations	   and	  
strategies?	   Here	   we	   used	   our	   interviews	   with	   the	   actors	   of	   the	   experiment:	  
participants,	  organizers	  and	  external	  stakeholders.	  	  
Figure	   1	   shows	   some	   examples	   of	   how	  we	   connected	   raw	   data	   to	   analytical	   categories	   and	  
theoretical	  concepts	  based	  on	  Rerup	  and	  Feldman	  audit	  trail	  (2011).	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  Figure	  1	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Exploring	  low-­‐carbon	  futures	  by	  designing	  in	  vitro	  carbon	  market	  devices	  
1997-­‐1998:	  shaping	  the	  collective	  inquiry	  	  
In	   1997,	   the	   Kyoto	   protocol	   set	   carbon	   emission	   targets	   for	   the	   Annex	   1	   countries,	  
materialising	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  carbon	  constrained	  future.	  Anticipating	  a	  carbon	  constraint	  in	  the	  
short	   run,	   the	  sector	  organised	  an	   inquiry	   into	  carbon	  market	   instruments:	  what	  would	   they	  
look	  like	  and	  what	  type	  of	  world	  would	  they	  produce?	  
In	  1997,	  some	  members	  of	  Eurelectric	  carried	  out	  an	  investigation	  on	  the	  SO2	  market	  
that	  was	   in	   place	   in	   the	   US.	   They	   gained	   practical	   knowledge	   on	   emission	   trading	   from	   the	  






utilities	   that	   were	   part	   of	   the	   scheme.	   They	   also	   interacted	   with	   members	   of	   the	   EPA	   and	  
discussed	  with	  them	  some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  features	  of	  the	  SO2	  scheme	  and	  lessons	  learnt.	  	  
In	   1998,	   Eurelectric	   organised	   two	   colloquiums	   on	   carbon	   trading	   in	   Brussels	   and	  
Austria,	  inviting	  both	  experts	  from	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  economists	  to	  present	  the	  principle	  
of	  emission	   trading.	   In	  particular,	  Eurelectric	   invited	  Charlotte	  Grezo	  –	  who	  was	   in	  charge	  of	  
the	   design	   of	   BP’s	   internal	   trading	   scheme	   –	   and	   Richard	   Baron,	   an	   expert	   on	   the	   carbon	  
economy	   from	   the	   International	   Energy	  Agency	   (IEA).	  After	   the	   colloquium,	   the	  members	  of	  
Eurelectric’s	   working	   group	   on	   climate	   change	   gathered	   and	   designed	   a	   generic	  model	   of	   a	  
carbon	  market	   on	   a	   black	   board.	   “Jean-­‐Yves	   [Caneill]	  who	   had	   visited	   the	   utilities	   in	   the	  US	  
provided	   interesting	   insight	   taken	   from	  the	  SO2	   trading	  scheme,	  while	  Bill	   [Kyte]	  and	   I	   relied	  
mostly	  on	  the	  input	  of	  Charlotte	  Grezo	  and	  Richard	  Baron”	  (Scowcroft,	  2012).	  	  
At	   the	   beginning	   of	   1999,	   Eurelectric	   invited	   the	   ParisBourse	   stock	   market	   and	   the	  
International	   Energy	   Agency	   to	   organise	   a	   simulation	   exercise	   –	   a	   role	   play	   within	   the	  
electricity	   sector	   –	   using	   the	   experimental	   carbon	   market	   they	   had	   designed.	   Eurelectric’s	  
generic	  model	  was	  refined	  together	  with	  the	  IEA.	  ParisBourse	  lent	  its	  trading	  platform	  during	  
the	  empty	  hours	  to	  perform	  the	  simulation.	  The	  first	  device	  was	  reduced	  to	  a	  trading	  platform,	  
a	   model	   generating	   uncertainty	   in	   electricity	   demand	   and	   a	   set	   of	   rules	   to	   frame	   the	  
simulation.	  The	  IEA	  was	  charged	  with	  supervising	  the	  exercise.	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As	   Richard	   Baron	   stressed,	   the	   GETS	   experiment	   was	   an	   exploratory	   exercise.	   “The	  
organisers	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  determine	  precisely	  a	  projected	  price	  of	  carbon	  or	  the	  design	  of	  a	  
carbon	   market	   for	   Europe”	   (Baron,	   2010).	   What	   were	   these	   strange	   objects	   called	   carbon	  
markets	  and	  what	  did	  they	   look	   like?	  What	  world	  did	  they	  offer	  and	  what	  future	  would	  they	  
trigger:	  fields	  of	  wind	  turbines,	  restrictions	  on	  electricity	  consumption?	  What	  type	  of	  strategic	  
activities	  and	  behaviours	  would	  they	  induce	  at	  company	  level:	  carbon	  trading,	  deployment	  of	  
clean	  technologies,	  research	  on	  new	  technologies	  or	  enhanced	  management	  of	  the	  production	  
capacity?	  What	   type	  of	   technical	  problems	  would	   they	   raise:	  was	   carbon	   trading	   compatible	  
with	  electricity	  trading	  in	  a	  liberalised	  sector?	  
	  
1999:	  Experimental	  carbon	  trading	  within	  the	  electricity	  sector	  
Nineteen	  power	  companies	  had	  agreed	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  role	  play.	  They	  were	  asked	  
to	  create	  a	  virtual	  profile:	  they	  had	  to	  choose	  their	  energy	  mix	  and	  installed	  capacity.	  A	  total	  of	  
sixteen	   virtual	   companies	   were	   created	   that	   had	   to	   comply	   with	   both	   national	   electricity	  
demand	  and	  a	  carbon	  emission	   target	   (8%	  over	  emissions	   for	   the	  year	  2000).	  To	   reach	   their	  
objectives,	   they	   could	   choose	   from	   three	   options:	   electricity	   trading,	   carbon	   trading,	   or	  
investing	   in	   clean	   technologies.	   The	   market	   place	   for	   electricity	   and	   CO2	   was	   the	   trading	  
platform,	  provided	  by	  ParisBourse.	  “The	  simulation	  period	  lasted	  eight	  weeks,	  and	  covered	  the	  
2000-­‐2012	   time	   scale.	   Each	   week	   represented	   either	   one	   or	   two	   years	   of	   activity.	   Virtual	  
companies	  could	  trade	  electricity	  and	  CO2	  once	  a	  week	  for	  two	  hours”	  (GETS1,	  1999).	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The	  results	  of	  GETS1:	  unveiling	  a	  carbon-­‐constrained	  future	  
The	   future-­‐oriented	   images	   provided	   by	   GETS1.	   The	  GETS1	   (1999)	   report	   drafted	   by	   the	   IEA	  
provides	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   images	   (charts,	   graphs,	   diagrams,	   tables	   etc.)	   that	  describe	   certain	  
aspects	   of	   the	   future	   –	   from	   2000	   to	   2012	   –	   that	  would	   be	   driven	   by	   a	   carbon	  market.	   An	  
important	  result	  of	  GETS1	  was	  that	  “investment,	  not	  trading,	  delivers	  compliance	  at	  the	  end.5”	  
It	  meant	   that	   under	   a	   carbon	  market,	   the	   energy	   structure	   in	   a	   future	  world	  might	   change	  
radically.	   The	   results	   of	   the	   role	   play	   suggested	   that	   until	   2012,	   the	   transition	  would	  mainly	  
involve	  switching	  primary	  energy	  use	  from	  coal	  to	  gas.	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Experiencing	  a	   carbon	  constrained	   future.	   The	   role	  play	  provided	  practical	  experience	  of	   this	  
carbon	   constrained	   future	   by	   enabling	   the	   virtual	   companies	   to	   elaborate	   and	   test	   a	   wide	  
range	   of	   compliance	   strategies.	   “Virtual	   companies	   were	   rapidly	   able	   to	   design	   decision-­‐
making	  tools”	  (Baron,	  2011).	  The	  market	  device’s	  ability	  to	  expediently	  deliver	  a	  carbon	  price	  
signal	   was	   seen	   as	   crucial	   to	   the	   elaboration	   of	   a	   compliance	   strategy	   –	   i.e.	   clean	   tech	  
investments	  vs.	  market	  strategies	  vs.	  plant	  management	  (GETS1,	  1999:	  1).	  Nevertheless,	  as	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Speech	  by	  John	  Scowcroft	  in	  Vienna,	  July	  2000.	  	  






was	  built	  under	  unrealistic	   assumptions,	   the	  experiment	  did	  not	   intend	   to	   	   anticipate	   future	  
carbon	  prices.	  
	  
Understanding	  carbon	  markets.	  The	  experiment	  generated	  knowledge	  on	  carbon	  markets	  and	  
how	  they	  could	  drive	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  future.	  To	  elaborate	  long-­‐term	  strategies,	  virtual	  companies	  
relied	   heavily	   on	   the	   possibility	   of	   banking6	   allowances	   from	   one	   commitment	   period	   to	  
another.	  In	  a	  sector	  like	  the	  power	  sector,	  the	  size	  of	  investment	  in	  new	  production	  is	  largely	  
dependent	  on	  the	  chosen	  technology:	  investing	  in	  a	  new	  300	  MW	  combined-­‐cycle	  gas	  turbine	  
may	  deliver	  more	  low-­‐emission	  generation	  than	  what	  the	  company	  needs	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  
with	  its	  CO2	  objective.	  “Banking	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  benefit	  from	  these	  additional	  reductions,	  
on	  top	  of	  the	  possibility	  to	  trade	  them	  immediately”	  (GETS1,	  1999:	  25).	  Virtual	  companies	  also	  
relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  “grace	  period”,	   that	   is	   to	  say	  the	  possibility	  of	  buying	  or	  selling	  permits	  
after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  commitment	  period.	  Such	  a	  “grace	  period”	  helps	  “handle	  the	  uncertainty	  
related	   to	  normal	  business	  operations”,	   that	  may	  affect	   compliance	   (GETS1,	  1999:	  p26).	  The	  
role	  play	  highlighted	  for	  the	  first	  time	  one	  major	  outcome:	  as	  the	  emission	  objectives	  did	  not	  
extend	   beyond	   2012,	   companies	   had	   little	   or	   no	   incentive	   to	   build	   long-­‐term	   strategies	   and	  
developed	  uneconomic	  behaviours.	  This	  is	  called	  the	  “wall	  effect”.	  Without	  long-­‐term	  targets,	  
the	  price	  of	  carbon	  falls	  to	  zero,	  which	  causes	  abnormal	  transactions,	  patterns	  and	  prices.	  
	  
Preparing	  for	  the	  next	  step,	  strategy	  building	  towards	  a	  shared	  image	  of	  the	  future	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Banking means that the credits that are not used for compliance during a given period can be used for 
compliance in the following period. 	  






From	   “carbon	  market	   reluctance”	   to	   “carbon	  market	   friendliness”	   in	   the	   power	   sector.	  Both	  
Jean-­‐Yves	   Caneill	   and	   John	   Scowcroft	   emphasised	   the	   role	   that	   GETS	   1	   played	   in	   reframing	  
representations	  within	  the	  electricity	  sector.	  Before	  the	  role	  play,	  there	  was	  no	  consensus	  on	  
carbon	  markets	  in	  the	  sector.	  Due	  to	  their	  energy	  mix,	  their	  economic	  culture	  and	  the	  national	  
context	   in	   which	   they	   were	   evolving,	   companies	   held	   contrasting	   views	   regarding	   carbon	  
markets.	   Companies	   in	   France	   and	   in	   the	   UK	   were	   in	   favour	   of	   carbon	   markets	   whereas	  
German	   companies	   were	   reluctant.	   They	   were	   working	   on	   voluntary	   agreements	   with	   their	  
government	  and	  a	  mandatory	  carbon	  market	  could	  jeopardise	  their	  efforts	  (Wettestad,	  2005).	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  experiment	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  a	  market	  was	  much	  more	  desirable	  than	  a	  tax	  
if	  a	  mandatory	  regulation	  was	  to	  come	  up:	  “the	  main	  learning	  point	  derived	  from	  GETS	  1	  was	  
that	   a	   carbon	  market	   could	   help	   reduce	   compliance	   costs”	   (Scowcroft,	   2010).	   After	   the	   role	  
play,	   companies	   envisioned	   carbon	   trading	   as	   a	   “tool	   for	   compliance”	   rather	   than	   a	   threat	  
(GETS1,	  1999:	  25).	  The	  sector	  agreed	  that	  carbon	  markets	  had	  to	  be	  explored	  further	  and	  that	  
they	  should	  be	  implemented	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  compliance	  at	  the	  European	  level.	  “The	  only	  actors	  
that	  were	  still	  reluctant	  after	  GETS1	  were	  the	  German	  companies.	  Two	  German	  companies	  out	  
of	  the	  three	  left	  the	  experiment	  during	  the	  second	  round”	  (Scowcroft,	  2012).	  	  
	  
Building	   strategic	   alliances	   with	   the	  main	   stakeholders.	   “Eurelectric	   presented	   the	   results	   of	  
GETS1	   at	   COP	   57	   in	   Bonn	   in	   1999.	   The	   presentation	  was	  well	   received	   and	   helped	   nourish	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Fifth	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  
Climate	  Change	  






constructive	   dialogue	   with	   the	   European	   Commission”	   (Caneill,	   2010).	   In	   parallel,	   the	  
Commission	  was	  working	  on	  a	  Green	  Paper	  on	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  trading,	  which	  was	  
likely	   to	   be	   the	   first	   step	   towards	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   carbon	   market	   in	   Europe.	   The	  
results	   of	  GETS	   1	  were	   used	   to	   draft	   a	   Position	   Paper	   on	   the	   Commission’s	  Green	   Paper,	   in	  
favour	   of	   carbon	   markets.	   Peter	   Vis,	   one	   of	   the	   civil	   servant	   of	   the	   Commission	   strongly	  
engaged	  in	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  Green	  Paper,	  was	  keen	  to	  promote	  the	  constructive	  attitude	  of	  
the	  power	  sector	  as	  it	  could	  become	  a	  key	  ally	  to	  implement	  the	  scheme.	  It	  was	  now	  of	  major	  
importance	   to	   convince	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   industry	   that	   perceived	   the	   GETS	   experiment	   as	   a	  
threat.	  They	  saw	  the	  experiment	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  electricity	  sector	  to	  secure	  strong	  positions	  
that	   only	   they	   would	   benefit	   from.	   “We	  were	   afraid	   that	   they	   could	   kill	   the	   process	   so	   we	  
decided	  to	  involve	  them	  in	  another	  simulation.	  Had	  we	  not	  involved	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  industry,	  we	  
might	  not	  have	  done	  GETS	  2”	  (Scowcroft,	  2012).	  	  
	   	  
2000.	  Re-­‐making	  the	  device	  and	  evaluating	  competing	  futures	  
The	   second	   simulation	   aimed	   at	   unveiling	   and	   evaluating	   different	   possible	   carbon	  
constrained	  worlds	  by	  testing	  different	  carbon	  market	  designs.	  To	  do	  so,	  the	  role	  play	  was	  re-­‐
organised	  and	  the	  GETS	  device	  was	  redesigned.	  	  
Re-­‐organising	   the	   role	   play.	   Six	   new	   industrial	   sectors8	   -­‐	   Iron	   and	   Steel;	   Refining;	  
Chemicals;	  Glass;	  building	  materials	  and	  Paper	  –	  and	  the	  financial	  sector	  were	   invited	  to	   join	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8All	  of	  the	  sectors	  discussed	  in	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  Green	  Paper	  on	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  
trading.	  






the	  exercise.	  “Three	  successive	  simulations	  were	  run	  (GETS	  2.1	  in	  February/March,	  GETS	  2.2	  in	  
April,	   and	   GETS	   2.3	   in	   June),	   thus	   making	   it	   possible	   to	   test	   and/or	   improve	   various	  
assumptions”	   (GETS	   2,	   2000).	   A	   Steering	   Committee	   was	   created	   among	   the	   organisers	   to	  
redesign	  the	  device,	  monitor	  the	  simulation	  and	  ‘theorise	  the	  output’.	  “We	  invited	  Peter	  Vis	  to	  
join	   the	   steering	   committee.	   He	   didn’t	   show	   up	   for	   every	   session	   but	   he	   did	   provide	  
considerable	   input.	   His	   cooperation	   helped	   us	   to	   ensure	   consistency	   between	   the	   European	  
Commission’s	   view	  and	   the	   industrial	   view”	   (Scowcroft,	   2012).	   PriceWaterhouseCoopers	  was	  
hired	  to	  develop	  the	  tools	  that	  would	  support	  the	  engineering	  of	  the	  GETS	  device.	  
Redesigning	   the	   device.	   To	  make	   the	   simulation	  more	   realistic	   and	   precise,	   the	   Steering	  
Committee	  introduced	  some	  changes	  to	  the	  device:	  the	  platform	  allowed	  for	  trading	  electricity	  
on	   both	   spot	   and	   future	   markets;	   variations	   in	   primary	   energy	   prices	   were	   introduced;	  
participants	   could	   receive	   emission	   reduction	   credits	   through	   two	   types	   of	   project	  
mechanisms9:	   the	   Clean	   Development	   Mechanism	   (CDM)	   and	   Demande	   Side	   Management	  
(DSM)	  projects.	  Carbon	  targets	  were	  extended	  beyond	  2012	  to	  ease	  the	  wall	  effect.	  To	  ensure	  
cooperation	  and	   involvement	   from	  the	   rest	  of	   the	   industry,	  newcomers	  were	  encouraged	   to	  
make	  their	  own	  proposals	  regarding	  the	  design	  of	  the	  device.	  The	  experimental	  status	  of	  the	  
GETS	   proved	   conducive	   to	   collectively	   proposing,	   debating	   and	   testing	   alternatives	   for	   the	  
design	   of	   the	   carbon	  market	   device.	   The	   Italian	   industry	   proposed	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	  
Demand-­‐Side	   Management	   project	   which	   raised	   double	   counting	   issues.	   The	   nature	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  These mechanisms enable Parties to achieve emission reductions or to remove carbon from the 
atmosphere cost-effectively in other countries.	  






experiment	  nevertheless	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  test,	  assess	  and	  ultimately	  collectively	  reject	  this	  
alternative.	   The	   industry	   was	   mostly	   in	   favour	   of	   allocating	   quotas	   using	   a	   grandfathering	  
approach:	  allocations	  based	  on	  historical	  emissions.	  But	  the	  cement	  sector	  was	  pushing	  for	  an	  
allocation	  method	   based	   on	   a	   technological	   benchmark.	  On	   the	   European	   Commission	   side,	  
Peter	   Vis	   advised	   to	   test	   an	   allocation	   method	   based	   on	   auctions.	   All	   three	   methods	   were	  
tested	  within	   three	   different	   simulations.	   To	  meet	   the	   demand	   of	   the	   cement	   industry	   that	  
was	   in	  favour	  of	  relative	  targets,	  and	  to	  test	  the	  ongoing	  developments	   in	  carbon	  markets	   in	  
the	  UK,	  the	  steering	  committee	  proposed	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  gateway	  that	  would	  enable	  
the	   coexistence	   of	   both	   relative	   and	   absolute	   targets.	   None	   of	   the	   participants	   from	   the	  
industry	   would	   take	   relative	   targets,	   so	   two	   electricity	   companies	   had	   to	   do	   so	   to	   test	   the	  
gateway.	  “The	  test	  showed	  that	  such	  a	  mechanism	  was	  very	  difficult	  to	  implement	  in	  practice,	  
as	  the	  algorithm	  designed	  by	  PwC	  bugged	  and	  they	  had	  to	  cheat	  on	  the	  allocations	  to	  make	  it	  
work”	  (Scowcroft,	  2012).	  
Designing	  a	  new	  relationship	  with	  time.	  Both	  the	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  simulation	  and	  
the	  design	  of	  new	   instruments	  were	  driven	  by	   the	   reconstruction	  of	  carbon	  markets'	  way	  of	  
relating	  to	  time.	  In	  GETS1	  the	  wall	  effect	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  clear	  long-­‐term	  targets	  
to	  take	  strategic	  action	  in	  the	  present.	  In	  GETS2,	  the	  timescale	  of	  the	  simulation	  was	  extended	  
from	   2012	   to	   2015.	   As	   future-­‐oriented	   decisions	   were	   expected	   to	   improve	   liquidity	   in	   the	  
present	   as	   well	   as	   encouraging	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   market	   price,	   two	   financial	   institutions	  
were	   invited	   (Holderbank	   and	   Natsource).	   The	   introduction	   of	   carbon	   credits	   in	   the	   second	  
simulation	  from	  Kyoto’s	  “Project	  Mechanisms”	  led	  to	  the	  superposition	  of	  two	  time	  scales:	  the	  






time	  of	  the	  market,	  that	  is,	  the	  present,	  and	  the	  time	  of	  the	  projects.	  The	  “time	  scale	  of	  Kyoto	  
projects”	  varies	  from	  one	  project	  to	  another,	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  project	  (medium-­‐term	  
in	  case	  of	   technology	   transfers,	   long-­‐term	   in	  case	  of	  biological	  or	  geological	   sequestration	  of	  
carbon).	   In	   the	  GETS,	   only	   three	   protocols	  were	   tested	   for	   CDM	   among	   the	  wide	   variety	   of	  
existing	   methodologies.	   Furthermore,	   each	   of	   the	   three	   simulations	   of	   GETS2proposes	   an	  
original	   relationship	   to	   time	   that	   opens	   onto	   a	   specific	   future.	   In	   GETS2.1,	   permits	   were	  
distributed	   based	   on	   past	   emissions.	   In	   GETS2.2,	   permits	   were	   distributed	   according	   to	   a	  
benchmark	  partly	  based	  on	  past	  emissions.	  In	  GETS2.3,	  permits	  were	  distributed	  partly	  based	  
on	   past	   emissions	   and	   partly	   through	   permit	   auctions.	   In	   the	   first	   configuration,	   the	   future	  
conditions	   are	   closely	   related	   to	   past	   tendencies:	   past	   emissions	   are	   the	   basis	   on	   which	  
present	  action	   is	   taken.	   In	  the	  second	  configuration,	   future	  conditions	  are	  related	  to	  present	  
conditions	   through	   the	   setting	   of	   a	   benchmark	   among	   the	   technologies	   available	   in	   the	  
present.	  The	  setting	  of	  a	  particular	  benchmark	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  considerable	  impact	  on	  future	  
conditions	  as	  it	  drives	  technology	  development.	  In	  the	  third	  configuration,	  past	  conditions	  are	  
no	  longer	  present.	  Future	  trends	  are	  directly	  anticipated	  by	  virtual	  companies	  that	  have	  to	  buy	  
as	  much	  CO2	  as	  they	  expect	  to	  produce	  during	  the	  compliance	  period.	  Thus,	  current	  decisions	  
rely	  on	  forecasts	  of	  industrial	  production	  and	  energy	  efficiency.	  
	  Such	   reshuffling	   of	   the	   past,	   present	   and	   future	   conditions	   was	   supported	   by	  
sophisticated	   instruments	   (creation	   of	   a	   gateway	   to	   enable	   the	   coexistence	   of	   benchmark	  
credits	   and	   emission	   permits,	   design	   of	   new	   allocation	   protocols,	   design	   of	   new	   reporting	  






protocols,	   etc.)	   and	   rules	   (setting	   a	   protocol	   to	   organise	   auctions,	   negotiating	   technology	  
benchmarks,	  etc.)	  that	  were	  designed	  by	  PriceWaterhouseCoopers	  (cf	  Figure	  5).	  	  
	  
	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Insert	  Figure	  5	  about	  here-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	  
Evaluating	   carbon	   constrained	  worlds.	  The	   report	  provides	  graphs	  and	  diagrams	   that	  display	  
four	   aspects	   of	   these	   futures:	   (1)	   the	   level	   of	   carbon	   emissions;	   (2)	   the	   state	   of	   the	   carbon	  
market;	  and	   (3)	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  model	  on	  company	  strategies	   (e.g.	   trading,	   fuel	   switching,	  
recycling,	  process	  improvement,	  change	  in	  raw	  materials).	  	  
	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Insert	  Figure	  6	  about	  here-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
The	  effects	  of	  GETS2:	  performing	  carbon	  markets	  
Building	   a	   shared	   vision	   at	   the	   industry	   level.	   The	   second	   simulation	   had	   a	   similar	   learning	  
impact	   as	  GETS1	   on	   the	   scale	   of	   the	   industry:	   “the	   role	   play	   provided	   the	   learning	   that	  was	  
necessary	   to	   convince	   the	   industry	   as	   it	   helped	   defuse	   the	   negative	   connotations	   associated	  
with	  it”	  (Caneill,	  2009).	  The	  experiments	  triggered	  an	  intellectual	  switch	  at	  the	  firm	  level:	  “the	  
experiment	  did	   convince	  my	  colleagues	  at	   Lafarge	   that	  were	  not	   familiar	  with	   the	  matter,	   in	  
particular	   in	   the	   financial	   division”	   (Boyd,	   2011).	   In	   particular,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  GETS	   device	  
would	  quickly	  deliver	  a	  price	  signal	  proved	  crucial	  in	  shaping	  the	  collective	  expectation	  that	  a	  
market	  device	  would	  deliver	  a	  “right”	  price	  of	  carbon	  rather	  than	  letting	  policy	  makers	  decide	  






what	   this	   price	   should	   be.	   The	   value	   of	   every	   proposition	   was	   assessed	   in	   this	   way	   by	   the	  
market	   test.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   GETS2,	   the	   industry	   converged	   on	   the	   design	   of	   GETS2.1	   that	  
provided	  the	  simplest	  and	  cheapest	  way	  to	  undertake	  a	  low	  carbon	  transition.	  
	  
Defending	   the	   GETS	   during	   the	   European	   Commission	   consultation	   process.	   The	   stakeholder	  
consultation,	   organised	   by	   the	   European	   Commission,	   supported	   “an	   intense	   process	   of	  
collective	  sense	  making”	  (Peter	  Zapfel,	  2011).	  GETS	  is	  not	  the	  only	  experiment	  that	  fuelled	  the	  
stakeholder	  meetings.	  Other	  schemes	  were	  “in	  competition”.	  Many	  governments	  –	  such	  as	  the	  
UK	   and	   Denmark	   –	   and	   industrial	   companies	   had	   developed	   their	   own	   original	   versions	   of	  
carbon	  markets	   (Akhurst	   et	   al,	   2003;	   Braun,	   2009;	   Christiansen	   and	  Wettestad,	   2003;	   Victor	  
and	   House,	   2006;	  Wettestad,	   2005).	   According	   to	   Peter	   Zapfel,	   BP	   and	   the	   UK	   government	  
were	  being	  particularly	  constructive	  and	  transparent	  in	  their	  contributions	  to	  the	  consultation.	  
The	  UK	  put	  on	  the	  table	  an	   intricate	  architecture	   linking	  a	  climate-­‐change	   levy	  with	  a	  carbon	  
market.	  BP,	  which	  had	   introduced	  an	   internal	  scheme	   in	  1998	  to	  reduce	   its	  carbon	   intensity,	  
also	  came	  up	  with	  a	  proposal.	  Nevertheless,	  BP’s	  proposal	  was	  very	  specific	  to	  one	  company,	  
and	   they	   ended	   up	   defending	   Eurelectric’s	   proposal.	   The	   simplest	   proposal	   was	   that	   of	  
Eurelectric’s	   GETS2,	   which	   had	   already	   been	   tested	   and	   approved	   by	   the	   main	   industrial	  
stakeholders.	  A	  year	   later,	   in	  December	  2001,	   the	  Commission	   invited	  Eurelectric	   to	  present	  
the	  results	  of	  GETS3	  (a	  sensitivity	  study,	  based	  on	  implementation	  scenarios,	  following	  the	  first	  
two	   experiments)	   at	   an	   official	   UNFCCC	   side	   event	   at	   COP	   6	   in	   Marrakesh,	   where	   the	  
Commission	  officially	  presented	  its	  first	  EU	  ETS	  draft	  directive	  proposal.	  







Discussion:	  linking	  future	  imaginings	  to	  the	  present	  through	  Collective	  Engineering	  	  
Linking	  action	  in	  the	  present	  to	  learning	  on	  the	  future	  conditions	  
In	  the	  GETS	  case	  study,	  the	  performation	  work	  and	  the	  exploration	  of	  a	  low	  carbon	  future	  
are	   undertaken	   jointly	   and	   inform	   one	   another.	   These	   two	   activities	   can	   continue	   through	  
engineering	  on	  the	  GETS	  device.	  The	  organisers,	  participants	  and	  supervisors	  of	  the	  GETS	  were	  
constantly	  taking	  decisions	  and	  assessing	  their	  effects	  on	  a	  hypothetical	  future	  by	  engineering	  
the	  GETS	  device.	  The	  device	  operated	  as	  an	  epistemic	  machine	  that	  produced	  knowledge	  on	  
both	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future,	  thus	  altering	  the	  actors’	  perceptions	  of	  reality	  (their	  interests,	  
strategies,	  relations,	  relation	  to	  time,	  etc.).	  Hence,	  engineering	  on	  the	  GETS	  device	  participated	  
in	  a	  low	  carbon	  transition	  as	  it	  helped	  to	  uncouple	  past	  tendencies	  from	  future	  conditions.	  The	  
construction	  of	  the	  future	  does	  not	  follow	  a	  linear	  path.	  It	   is	  a	  chaotic	  process	  of	  exploration	  
involving	  innovation	  through	  trial	  and	  error.	  
	  
Performing	  carbon	  markets:	  the	  GETS	  device	  as	  a	  mediating	  instrument	  
To	  understand	  the	  strong	  role	  played	  by	  the	  GETS	   in	  performing	  carbon	  markets,	  we	  
build	  on	  Miller	  and	  O’Leary’s	   (2007)	  notion	  of	  a	  mediating	   instrument.	  First,	   the	  GETS	  device	  
mediated	   between	   actors	   and	   domains	   that	   usually	   do	   not	   cooperate	   naturally	   with	   one	  
another.	  Second,	  it	  organised	  the	  connection	  of	  different	  time	  scales,	  thus	  reshuffling	  the	  link	  
between	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  conditions.	  







Mediation	  between	  actors	  and	  domains.	  
The	  GETS	  device	  provided	  a	  strong	  basis	  for	  coordination	  among	  the	  main	  stakeholders	  
of	   the	   inquiry	   on	   carbon	   markets:	   the	   electricity	   sector,	   the	   industry,	   the	   European	  
Commission,	   economists,	   iNGOs,	   etc.	   First,	   its	   collective	   design	   enabled	   the	   sharing	   of	  
heterogeneous	   knowledge:	   economic	   theory;	   knowledge	   on	   technology	   development	  
capacities;	  modelling;	  financial	  markets,	  etc.	  This	  knowledge	  was	  shared	  through	  the	  collective	  
engineering	  of	  the	  GETS	  device	  and	  embedded	  in	  various	  details	   (tools,	  models,	   instruments,	  
etc.).	   The	   role	  play	  provided	   the	   actors	  of	   the	  GETS	  experiment	  with	   shared	   knowledge	  and	  
expectations	  regarding	  the	  carbon	  market.	  Second,	  the	  exploratory	  status	  of	  the	  GETS	  enabled	  
cooperative	   relations	   that	   might	   have	   been	   difficult	   to	   obtain	   directly	   in	   the	   arena	   of	  
stakeholder	   consultation.	   In	   particular,	   the	   interactions	   between	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	  
organisers	  of	  the	  GETS	  help	  explain	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  two	  designs.	  Thus,	  the	  GETS	  
mediated	  between	  people	  and	  domains	  of	  knowledge	  that	  don’t	  coexist	  easily.	  By	  enabling	  the	  
management	   of	   knowledge	   about	   both	   carbon	  markets	   and	   a	   low	   carbon	   future,	   the	   GETS	  
supported	  the	  constitution	  of	  an	  epistemic	  community	  (Amin	  and	  Cohendet,	  2004).	  
	  
Mediation	  between	  different	  temporalities	  
Engaging	   in	  a	   low-­‐carbon	  transition	   involves	  a	   reshuffling	  of	  past,	  present	  and	   future	  
conditions	  so	  the	  future	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  projection	  of	  past	  and	  present	  tendencies.	  The	  GETS	  
experiment	  enabled	  different	  combinations	  of	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  conditions	  to	  be	  tested	  






through	   continuous	   engineering	   of	   the	   device.	   Each	   relationship	   to	   time	   was	   supported	   by	  
sophisticated	   instrumentation.	   For	   example,	   from	   GETS1	   to	   GETS2,	   this	   relationship	   was	  
reconstructed	   by:	   (1)	   refining	   the	   device:	   long-­‐term	   targets	   were	   introduced,	   trading	   was	  
enabled	  on	  both	   spot	   and	   future	  markets,	   and	   carbon	   credits	   from	  Kyoto	  mechanisms	  were	  
introduced;	   (2)	   reorganising	   practices	   on	   the	   device:	   two	   financial	   institutions	   –	   Holderbank	  
and	  Natsource	  –	  were	  invited	  and	  the	  simulation	  was	  divided	  into	  three	  commitment	  periods	  
instead	   of	   two;	   and	   (3)	   testing	   three	   different	   allocation	   configurations	   relating	   to	   three	  
different	  combinations	  for	  the	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  conditions.	  	  
	  
Mediating	   instruments	   as	   the	   core	   of	   experimental	   platforms.	   The	   GETS	   experiment	   was	  
undertaken	   in	   a	   space	   that	   Muniesa	   and	   Callon	   (2007)	   call	   platforms.	   The	   platform	  
configuration	   refers	   to	   a	   space	   that	   is	   more	   open	   than	   the	   laboratory	   and	   enables	   the	  
participation	   of	   a	   great	   variety	   of	   actors	   that	   form	   an	   epistemic	   community.	   The	  GETS	   case	  
study	  provides	  insights	  on	  these	  experimental	  platforms	  which	  have	  two	  main	  components:	  (1)	  
a	  core	  that	   is	  a	  mediating	   instrument;	  and	  (2)	  an	  epistemic	  community	  that	  evolves	  with	  the	  




The	  GETS	   experiment	  did	  more	   than	   support	   the	  performation	  of	   carbon	  markets	   in	  
Europe.	  It	  supported	  the	  collective	  sense-­‐making	  that	  took	  place	  around	  carbon	  markets	  after	  






the	  Kyoto	  protocol.	   “After	  Kyoto,	   carbon	  markets	  where	   rather	  unknown	  and	  curious	  objects	  
that	  mostly	   belonged	   to	   the	   realm	  of	   academic	   fantasy”	   (Zapfel,	   2011).	   At	   the	   end	  of	   2000,	  
namely	  at	  the	  Hague	  Conference	  (COP	  6),	  Eurelectric	  secured	  a	  slot	  from	  UNFCCC	  to	  present	  
the	  GETS	  2	  results.	  ”I	  remember	  the	  room	  –	  which	  was	  the	  largest	  side	  event	  room!	  –	  was	  full	  
of	  people.	  The	  presentation	  of	  GETS	  2	  was	  attended	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  side	  events	  
of	  the	  Conference”	  (Caneill,	  2010).	  This	  presentation	  by	  Eurelectric	  of	  the	  first	  carbon	  market	  
pilots,	   in	   front	   of	   the	   international	   community,	   was	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   huge	   international	  
learning	  process	  on	  carbon	  markets.	  Furthermore,	  the	  materialisation	  of	  the	  EU-­‐ETS	  was	  by	  far	  
means	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story.	  First,	  the	  EU-­‐ETS	  has	  been	  –	  or	  rather	  is	  being	  –	  replicated	  in	  
other	  countries	  that	  are	  building	  their	  own	  climate	  strategy.	  The	  performative	  effect	  of	  GETS	  
might	  not	  be	  visible	  but	   it	   is	  embedded	  in	  the	  details	  of	  the	  emerging	  schemes	  that	  take	  the	  
EU-­‐ETS	   as	   a	   model.	   Second,	   the	   participants	   of	   the	   GETS	   are	   often	   asked	   to	   present	   their	  
experience	   in	   other	   countries.	   Members	   of	   the	   utilities	   present	   the	   experiment	   to	   their	  
counterparts	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   governments	   in	   other	   countries	   willing	   to	   develop	   an	   ETS.	  
Building	  on	  GETS1,	  the	  IEA	  organised	  a	  region-­‐wide	  simulation	  in	  the	  Balkan	  countries.	  
Organising	  a	  low-­‐carbon	  transition	  is	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  research,	  development	  and	  
deployment	  of	  new	  technologies	   in	  engineering	   laboratories	   to	  uncouple	  growth	  and	  carbon	  
emissions;	   it	   is	   also	   a	   matter	   of	   uncoupling	   the	   future	   conditions	   from	   the	   past	   conditions	  
when	  setting	  frameworks	  for	  action.	  The	  framework	  for	  action	  in	  Europe	  lies	  in	  the	  details	  of	  
the	   EU-­‐ETS	   design	   that	   reshuffles	   the	   link	   between	   the	   past	   present	   and	   future	   conditions.	  
Experiments	  like	  the	  GETS	  are	  central	  in	  testing	  different	  configurations	  for	  action	  frameworks.	  






The	  GETS	  device	  served	  to	  compare	  and	  test	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  past,	  present	  and	  
future	  conditions.	  The	  reason	  why	  there	  are	  only	  few	  traces	  of	  this	  experiment	  in	  the	  literature	  
might	  be	  because	  the	  construction	  of	  knowledge	  is,	  by	  nature	  collective:	  concepts	  and	  images	  
are	   produced,	   they	   circulate,	   and	   they	   perform	   reality.	   The	   GETS	   output	   are	   invisible,	   they	  
circulate	   in	   forms	   of	   concepts,	   images	   among	   the	   discussions	   on	   carbon	   trading,	   and	   they	  
frame	  the	  response	  to	  climate	  change	  more	  and	  more	  as	  carbon	  markets	  are	  being	  replicated.	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GETS	  2.1	  (2000) EU-­‐ETS	  Pilote	  (2003)
Market	  Type Cap	  and	  trade	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Cap	  and	  trade	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Target Absolute Absolute
Asset 1	  permit	  =	  1tCO2eq 1	  permit	  =	  1tCO2eq
Constraint Up-­‐stream Up-­‐stream
Coverage 6	  Kyoto	  Gases CO2
Allocation	  mode Grandfatherng Grandfatherng
Permits	  restitution End	  of	  each	  commitment	  
Period
End	  of	  each	  commitment	  
Period
Opt-­‐in	  Opt-­‐out No No
Carbon	  price	  mechanisms
Ceiling	  price No No
Threshold	  price No No
Credits



























































The	  GETS	  participated	  to	  collective	  inquiry	  
on	  carbon	  markets:	  “After	  Kyoto,	  carbon	  
markets	  where	  rather	  unknown	  and	  curious	  
objects	  that	  mostly	  belonged	  to	  the	  realm	  
of	  academic	  fantasy”	  (Zapfel,	  2011).	  
The	  GETS	  supported	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  
epistemic	  community:	  “Thanks	  to	  the	  
community	  of	  knowledge	  and	  with	  the	  
inputs	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  […]”	  
GETS2,	  2000:7)	  
The	  GETS	  reframed	  the	  representations	  of	  
actors:	  “The	  GETS	  provided	  the	  intellectual	  
switch	  that	  was	  necessary	  to	  support	  the	  
implementation	  of	  carbon	  markets	  
(Caneill,2011)	  	  
The	  GETS	  enabled	  the	  testing	  of	  different	  
versions	  of	  economic	  theory:	  “Three	  
successive	  simulations	  were	  run	  […],	  thus	  
making	  it	  possible	  to	  test	  and/improve	  
various	  assumptions”	  (GETS2	  2000:6)	  
The	  GETS	  supported	  the	  power’s	  sector	  
strategy	  in	  the	  negotiation	  process:	  “We	  
used	  the	  GETS	  as	  a	  political	  to	  support	  the	  
electricity	  sector’s	  vision	  of	  a	  carbon	  
market”	  (Scowcroft,	  2010)	  
Heterogeneous	  
knowledge	  and	  
models	  inside	  the	  
device:	  SO2	  scheme/	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  The	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GETS	  as	  a	  mediating	  
instrument	  
Between	  actors	  
Between	  time	  scales	  




Knowledge	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Using	  the	  device	  
1998.	  Design	  of	  a	  
generic	  model	  	  
	  








emission	  trading	  	  
	  
1999.	  Simulation1	  
2000.	  Simulation	  2	  
Interviews	  with	  
the	  organizers	  










































Rules	  of	  the	  Games	  
	  
Market	  type Cap	  and	  trade
Commodity 1	  quota	  =	  1tCO2eq
Constraint Up-­‐stream
Scope 6	  Kyoto	  Gases
Allocation	   Grandfathering


















Participants	  =	  Utilities	  
Master	  of	  the	  Game:	  IEA	  
Organizers	  of	  the	  Game:	  Eurelectric	  
Actors	  
Management	  of	  the	  simulation	  
Trading	  platform	  
	  
Models:	  Electricity	  demand	  
Clean	  Technologies	  Investments	  
































In	  2000	  	  
Nuclear	   1000	  MW	  
Coal	   4	  x	  550	  MW	  
Fuel	  oil/gas	   3	  x	  350	  MW	  
Hydro	  run	  of	  river	   6	  x	  200	  MW	  
Hydro	  reservoir	   4	  x	  200	  MW	  


















for	  2008	  	  
Step4:	  
Comply	  




























Table	  2.	  From	  GETS1	  to	  GETS2:	  remaking	  the	  device	  




Revising	  the	  basic	  frame	  on	  the	  outputs	  of	  GETS1	  
Electricity	  
trading	  	  












Constant	   Yearly	  changes	  







changes	  in	  prices	  
PwC	  
Targets	   Until	  2012	   Until	  2015	   The	  
steering	  
Committee	  




Collective	  engineering	  of	  the	  device	  
Allocation	   Grandfathering	   Grandfathering	   The	  
industry	  
Setting	  a	  baseline	   The	  steering	  
Committee	  
Benchmarking	   The	  Cement	  
sector	  




Auctioning	   The	  
European	  
Commission	  
Auction	  Protocol	   PwC	  










	   	   CDM	   The	  
industry	  
3	  protocols	   PwC	  
Offset	  
trading	  
No	   DSM	   The	  Italian	  
utilities	  
4	  protocols	   PwC	  
Management	  of	  the	  simulation	  
Reporting	  	   	   	   	   Reporting	  protocol	   PwC	  
	   	   	   Reporting	  tool	   PwC	  
	   	   	   Monitoring	  system	  	   PwC	  
Information	   	   Exchanges	  
among	  
participants	  
	   Forum	   PwC	  
	   Real	  time	  
information	  
system	  
	   Real	   time	  
information	  system	  
PwC	  










Rules	  of	  the	  Game GETS	  2.2 Asspciated	  Tools
Market	  Type Cap	  and	  trade	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Absolute	  +	  Index	  based	  
emissions
α	  =	  1	  -­‐	  │Σ	  negative	  
EPCs│/Σ	  positive	  
EPCs
Asset 1	  permit	  =	  1tCO2eq
Constraint Up-­‐stream
Coverage 6	  Kyoto	  Gases
Allocation	  mode Benchmarking
X	  %	  x	  Grandfathering	  




CDM1&2,	  JI Yes,	  30%	  	  limit 3	  protocoles





Participants Utilities	  +	  6	  Industrial	  




Steering	  Committee PwC	  +	  Eurelectric	  +	  
Paris	  Stock	  Exchange	  
+	  informal	  
participaion	  of	  the	  
EC
Actors











Figure	  6.	  Share	  of	  new	  renewables	  in	  the	  total	  installed	  generation	  capacity	  in	  GETS2.	  in	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